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11.  Introduction
In April 1994, the Norwegian airline industry was deregulated.  All domestic firms were free
to enter, and they were free to set prices and to determine the time location of their flights as
well as the number of flights on each route. A major argument for the deregulation was to
trigger more intense rivalry between firms and thereby to enhance efficiency.  As shown in the
literature, deregulation can result in substantial benefits.1  In particular, deregulation can result
in more price competition and force the firms to lower its costs.  The purpose of this article is
to investigate in detail the nature of competition in the post-regulation regime in the
Norwegian airline industry.  Did deregulation trigger rivalry between the firms?  If yes, did
they compete on prices, or along other dimensions such as capacity? We construct a
theoretical model, and formulate hypotheses which we test on data for the Norwegian airline
industry before and after the deregulation.
Two Norwegian airlines, SAS and Braathens, were the active firms in the
Norwegian airline industry before deregulation.2 SAS and Braathens continued to be the only
active airlines after deregulation.  On 24 out of 32 routes, the legal monopolist from the era of
regulation continued to be a monopolist.  On the remaining 8 routes, the two firms were both
active after deregulation.
                                                       
1In a survey of the effects of deregulation of American industry, Winston (1993) concludes that ‘.. the evidence
clearly shows that microeconomists’ predictions that deregulation would produce substantial benefits for
Americans have been generally accurate’ (p. 1286).  McGowan and Seabright (1989) discuss in a broad
context whether the experience from the deregulation of the US airline industry is applicable to the European
airline industry.  Their study, as well as Good, Røller and Sickles (1993), found that the European carriers
have a substantial cost disadvantage vis-a-vis their US rivals, and therefore that a large potential gain from
deregulation would come from cost reductions. Norman and Strandenes (1994) showed that there were large
potential benefits from deregulating the route Oslo-Stockholm, partly because of lower prices and partly
because of larger flight frequency.  The results from the empirical studies, though, are more mixed.  See, for
example, Borenstein (1989, 1990), Borenstein and Rose (1994), Brander and Zhang (1990, 1993), Evans and
Kassides (1994), Hurdle et al. (1989) and Whinson and Collins (1992) concerning US, and Encaoua (1991),
Neven and Røller (1996),  Marin (1995, 1998) and Røller and Sickles (1997) concerning Europe.
2The markets in question are all routes in Norway, except for those between small airports (kortbanenettet).
2Prior to deregulation, both firms threatened to cut prices following deregulation.
However, a study indicates that there was no price reduction on the full fare tickets in the
business travelers’ segment following deregulation, and only a minor increase in the share of
discounted tickets.3  The study, though, is not an empirical test. The conclusions are drawn
from observing descriptive statistics.4  Therefore, one may ask whether the firms colluded on
prices or whether customers shifted from purchasing full fare to discounted tickets.  If the
latter is true, we have de facto competition on prices although the prices of full fare tickets are
not affected by the deregulation.  Moreover, there are also some casual observations
suggesting that it has been a large increase in capacity following deregulation.5  However, one
possible explanation could be that this is due to a general growth in demand. Alternatively, the
capacity increase might also be driven by intense rivalry on capacity triggered by collusion on
prices. The question we ask is therefore: did the firms compete on capacity and collude on
price, or did they either collude or compete along both dimensions following deregulation.
This is what we have set out to test.
The article is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we formulate the model. Two
firms choose price and capacity, and it is either competition or collusion on each (or both)
choice variable(s).  To test the hypotheses derived in Section 2, we specify in Section 3 an
econometric model.  The empirical results are reported in Section 4, and in Section 5 we
summarize our results.
                                                       
3This is shown in Lian (1996).  He finds that the share of the discounted tickets increased with 2.5 %-point
from 1992 to 1994-95.  According to Lian (1996) this is no dramatic change: ‘a 2-3 %-point increase in
discount tickets in two-three years is in line with a long term trend and imply no sudden change in this trend’
[our translation] (p. 15).  The increase in the share of discounted tickets are larger in the ‘leisure’ segment
than in the business segment [see Lian (1996), tabell 4.4].
4 Salvanes, Steen and Sørgard (1997) analyse the location pattern of flights in the Norwegian airline industry
after the deregulation in April 1994. They find statistical support for the hypotheses that clustering is more
prevalent in the business travellers’ segment than in general, something which in their model is consistent
with more collusion on prices in the business travellers’ segment than in general. They also refer to direct
statements by the firms’ representatives, supporting this view.
32.  A theoretical model
Let us consider a duopoly where firms choose both price and capacity. Since prices are
typically more flexible than capacity, we assume the following game:
Stage 1: Both firms set capacities
Stage 2: Both firms set prices
If the firms behave non-cooperatively on both stage 1 and 2, we have a game which is
analysed in Kreps and Scheinkmann (1983).  They show that, when certain assumptions are
met, the equilibrium is identical to the Cournot equilibrium.  We label this the competitive
regime.6  If the firms behave cooperatively on both stages, the firms behave as a cartel and
thereby attains the monopoly equilibrium concerning both price and capacity setting.  We label
this the  collusive regime.  A third alternative is that the firms behave cooperatively for one
choice variable, and non-cooperatively for the second choice variable.  As we argued, price is
typically easier to change than capacity.  As is well known from theory of repeated games, it is
easier to collude on a choice variable that can be changed very rapidly.  Hence, we find it
natural to assume that the firms can collude on prices and compete on capacities.7 We label
this the semicollusive regime.8
                                                                                                                                                                           
5For example, during the first year after deregulation, total capacity for routes to and from Oslo increased by
12.5 % [see Lian (1996), Table 5.2].
6If there is no commitment power concerning capacity setting and the firms compete on both capacities and
prices, then in equilibrium we would have price equal to long run marginal costs.  However, it can be shown
that such a change in the definition of the competitive regime would not change the two hypotheses that are
formulated later:  A competitive regime following deregulation would result in an increase in capacity, and a
marginal change in the market size has the same effect on capacity in a small and a large market.
7The fourth alternative would be capacity collusion and price competition.  Then the firms could achieve the
collusive outcome concerning both prices and capacities simply by setting the monopoly capacity.  Hence, the
outcome of this fourth alternative would be identical to the outcome in what we labelled the collusive regime.
8The semicollusion game we analyse here was first introduced in Fershtman and Gandal (1994). All theoretical
studies of semicollusion assume collusion in the product market (either on prices or quantity) and competition
4Let us assume the following inverse demand function:
P = A - Q1 - Q2 (1)
where P is price, Qi quantity supplied by firm i, i=1,2, and A a parameter measuring the
demand potential.  Furthermore, let CS denote short run marginal cost and CL cost per unit of
installing capacity.  Ki denotes capacity for firm i, where i=1,2, and K = K1 + K2.  Let us
consider each of the three cases.
Collusive regime (price- and capacity cartel)
Obviously, the firms have no incentives to build idle capacity.  Therefore, we have that Qi=Ki
for firm i. The following capacity is installed:
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Then we have the following effect of a change in the demand:9
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Competitive regime (price- and capacity competition)
As for collusion, there is no reason for the firms to install idle capacity.  The following
capacity is installed in equilibrium:
K K K
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3
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. (4)
                                                                                                                                                                           
along other dimensions.  Competition on capacity is analysed in Fershtman and Muller (1986), Osborne and
Pitchik (1987), Davidson and Deneckere (1990), Matsui (1989) and Fershtman and Gandal (1994);
competition on R & D is analysed in Katz (1986), D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1987), Kamien et.al. (1992)
and Fershtman and Gandal (1994); competition on location is analysed in Friedman and Thisse (1993).  For a
survey of the literature, see Fershtman and Gandal (1994) or Phlips (1995), chpts 9 and 10.
9Strictly speaking, we investigate the effect of a change in the demand potential, i.e., the demand curve’s
intercept with the vertical axes.  By changing A, we observe a parallel shift in the demand curve.
5Then we have the following effect of a change in the demand:
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Semicollusive regime ( price collusion and capacity competition)
The firms succeed in coordinating their price setting.  At stage 2, the collusive price is found
by solving the following problem:
pi
i 1
2
P
max S(P C )
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å = - - ×Q K CL , (6)
If  K < (A - CS)/2, the marginal revenue exceeds the short run marginal cost when all capacity
is used for production.  Hence, the firms set the price so that the entire capacity is used for
production.  Then, the market price is P = A - K.
If K ³ (A - CS)/2, it is optimal to set P = (A + Cs)/2.  If so, the firms install excess
capacity.10  Then it remains to determine the sharing rule - each firm’s quota in the market.  In
that case we assume that:
Q
K
D(P)i
K i=
K
. (7)
Each firm’s market share is thus identical to its share of total capacity. There are, at least, two
reasons for a positive relationship between its own share of total capacity and its own share of
total sale.  First, the larger the capacity the larger the probability that there is a vacant seat at
                                                       
10With excess capacity, we mean capacity in excess of what is needed for supplying this particular market.
However, this does not necessarily imply that some capacity is idle.  It could be that the residual capacity is
used for supplying another market segment.  For the market in question, the first market segment can be the
business segment and the second one can be the leisure/holiday segment.  The interpretation of our model is
then that we have modelled the first market segment, and implicitly assume tough competition in the leisure
segment so that price in that segment equals short run marginal costs.  Alternatively, we could have assumed
that the price in the leisure segment was in between the short run and the long run marginal costs.  See Steen
and Sørgard (1998), where such an alternative model is analysed.  They find the same mechanism as the one
that turns out to be crucial one here, that capacity is very sensitive to marginal changes in demand in the
semicollusive regime when the market is of sufficiently large size.  Due to this, our hypotheses is expected not
to change if we extend the model to the one in Steen and Sørgard (1998).
6the airline firm in question.  Second, the larger the capacity the larger the number of flights and
thereby the service frequency for the airline firm in question.  More generally, when products
and prices are identical it is reasonable to assume that the demand is distributed so that each
firm’s sale is related to its share of total supply in the market.
At stage 1, the firms set capacity non-cooperatively. Firm i has the following
maximization problem:
pi
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Given that K £  (A - CS)/2, we are back to the case where all capacity is used for production.
Then each firm determines its sale by determining its capacity, and price is set to clear the
market.  Hence, the firms compete for capacity and we have an outcome analogous to the
competition regime we specified previously.  If K > (A - CS)/2, then the firms installs more
capacity than what is demanded in the market at the collusive price.  From the first order
conditions, we have the following total capacity in equilibrium:
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Then we have that the firms install more capacity than what is used for production if:
A C A C
C
S S
L
-
<
-
2
2
16
2( )
(10)
7Competition
Semicollusion
CS+CL A
(A-CS)/2
CS+4CL
 Rearranging, we find that the firms install excess capacity if A > 4CL + CS.  Given that A >
4CL + CS, we have the following change in equilibrium capacity as a result of a marginal
change in the demand:
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Now we can use two illustrations to summarise our results so far, and to formulate hypotheses
which we will apply for empirical testing.
If P=A, demand equals zero.  Hence, production is zero at CS+CL=A.  We know from
the analysis that an increase in A will have a more limited effect on equilibrium capacity under
collusion than under semicollusion or competition.  Therefore, in Figure 1 the capacity curve is
flatter in the collusive regime than in the other two regimes.
 Figure 1: Market size and total capacity
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Then we can formulate our first hypothesis, which is relevant for the shift from a regulated
regime - which we interpret as a collusive regime - to a deregulated regime:
Hypothesis 1: If the nature of competition shifts from a collusive regime to either a
semicollusive or a competitive regime, a positive shift in the total capacity is observed.
If we reject the hypothesis that the nature of competition is collusion after the deregulation,
the next step would be to distinguish between the two other regimes we have specified.  To do
so, we have to look at how total capacity is affected by a change in the demand.  This is
illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Market size and the effect on total capacity by changes in demand
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Note that the effect on total capacity by a marginal change in the demand is not affected by the
market size in the competitive regime. On the other hand, in the semicollusive regime the
market size matters. The larger the market size, the larger the effect on total capacity by a
marginal change in the demand. Now we can formulate our second hypothesis:
Competition
9Hypothesis 2: If a marginal change in the demand has a larger effect in a large than in a
small market, then the observation is consistent with a semicollusive regime and inconsistent
with a competitive regime.
To understand the distinction between the semicollusive and the competitive regime, note that
an expansion of own capacity will result in a lower price in the competitive regime.  This
dampens the incentive to expand capacity.  In the semicollusive regime, on the other hand,
such a capacity expansion does not affect the price.  The only - and important - effect, is that it
increases the firm’s market share, since its market share is determined by its share of total
capacity.  The larger the market size, the larger the absolute increase in sale by increasing its
market share with a certain amount.  Hence, a firm has stronger incentives to expand its
capacity the larger the size of the market.
3. An econometric model
The Norwegian airline industry has many of the features observed in other European
countries. The largest routes in Norway are of almost equal size as the routes between many
specific airports inside Europe as well as inside United States.11 Before 1987 one single firm
was given the exclusive right to have flights on each route. Both prices, the number of flights
and time location were regulated.  However, there are indications that the regulation had only
                                                       
11Not surprisingly, the number of flights between city pairs as, for example, San Francisco-Los Angeles and
London-Amsterdam, are much higher than between city pairs in Norway.  However, when we take into account
the fact that there are several airports in each of these large cities, then the number of flights between specific
airports are at the same level as the number of flights on the largest routes in Norway [see Strandenes (1990)].
10
a minor or no impact at all on the firm’s price setting.12 In October 1987, a second airline was
permitted to have a limited number of flights for some particular routes - four flights at a
maximum on each route. In April 1994, all routes, except those between the smallest airports,
were further deregulated, and free entry for all Norwegian firms were permitted.13
In order to test our two hypotheses regarding the effect on capacity following
deregulation, we have used annual data for 11 routes for the years 1985-95 (see the Appendix
for details concerning the data). The routes are shown in Figure 3. The development in the
number of passengers and capacity are shown for four of these routes in Figure 4.  Apparently,
the capacity increase following deregulation is larger on the two duopoly routes then on the
two monopoly routes. What we attempt to achieve in the econometric tests is to see whether
differences in capacity changes between routes also hold systematically for all the duopoly
routes when we control for factors as changes in size of the market and deregulation.
Figure 3 and 4 here
We specify two main models, one for each hypothesis:
Test of hypothesis 1: Collusion vs. Competition/Semicollusion
Model (I) tiiREGMONREGtiPASti MONREGREGPASCAP ,94,, *9494 ebbba ++++=
                                                       
12The regulation dates back to the 40s.  Each firm had to apply to the civil aviation authorities concerning price
changes, typically once every year.  Then each firm could argue that they have had cost increases, an argument
that the authorities would find difficult to disprove.  Norman and Strandenes (1994) have calibrated the market
equilibrium on the route Stockholm-Oslo prior to deregulation in 1993, and they conclude that ‘[i]nsofar our
calibrated coefficients seem “reasonable”, the regulatory constraint cannot be severe’. (p. 96)  Hence, their
study give support to our conjecture that the regulation had no substantial impact on the price setting.
13The traffic at the smallest airports, all included in the so-called “kortbanenettet”, was licensed to a third
Norwegian carrier; Widerøe.
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Test of hypothesis 2: Competition vs. Semicollusion
Model (II) tiiREGLARGEREGtiPASti LARGEREGREGPASCAP ,94,, *9494 ebbba ++++=
CAPi,t is capacity by routes i=1-11, for t=1985-95, PAS i,t  is the number of passengers by
routes representing the demand for airline services, REG94 the deregulation dummy defined as
one for 1994 and onwards, MON i defines whether a route is a monopoly route also after the
deregulation with non-monopoly routes as the reference category.14 LARGEi defines the four
largest routes, and ei,t is an error term with standard properties. The reason for not choosing a
continuous variable like passengers to represent size in model (II), is the size structure of these
routes, where the four largest routes are on average four times the size of the smaller routes.15
Furthermore, the four largest routes are very similar in size. See Table A1 in the Appendix for
an overview over which routes are included, and how the LARGE i variable is defined.
In model (I) we test whether deregulation of the Norwegian airline regime led to
intense rivalry. By assumption, a collusive regime was reached under regulation. The
prediction from theory (Hypotheses 1) is that a shift to a semicollusive or a competitive regime
results in a positive shift in total capacity. In model (I) we test this by interacting the regulation
indicator variable and the monopoly variable. If this interaction terms is negative, and
controlling for the increase in demand by including PAS i,t, this implies that deregulation led to
increased capacity for the routes shifting from monopoly to duopoly.
Given that we find that deregulation led to an increase in capacity, our second model
tests whether deregulation led to a competitive or a semicollusive regime. If a marginal change
                                                       
14An alternative specification would have been to construct the capacity utilisation index (CU=PAS/CAP), and
used this as the right hand side variable. However, and as noted in footnote 10, the firms might try to sell the
extra capacity in the leisure segment, thereby reducing the number of idle seats. If this is the case, PAS will
become higher, CU lower and we would obtain a biased measure of the capacity increase in the business
segment using the CU measure on the right hand side. Note that if this effect is important, the specification
used will also be biased; with CAP at the right hand side where we control for the market size using all
passengers, our test is biased in  favour of finding no capacity increase after the deregulation.
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in demand for airline services had a stronger impact on total capacity the larger the market is
(Hypotheses 2), this would be consistent with a semicollusive regime and inconsistent with a
competitive regime. Hence, the main variable in model (II) is thus the interaction term between
the size of the market and the regulation indicator, REG94*LARGE, defining the impact on
capacity of the four largest routes following the deregulation. Again, we control for market
size and the deregulation by including the passengers and the regulation dummy also in model
(II). A possible problem in model (II) is too much overlap in flights between large routes and
duopoly routes; a possible difference between small and large routes mirrors the difference
between duopoly and monopoly, rather then the difference between large and small routes. As
a refinement of the test between semicollusion and a competition regime, we therefore
estimate a second version of model (II) where we only include duopoly routes.
In addition to estimation using OLS we extend the analysis to include fixed effect
estimation, an instrument variable technique, and control for heteroscedasticity. The
interpretation of the within estimator is that differences over flights which are fixed in the data
period and not captured by included variables, particular characteristics such as load factor
etc., are controlled for. Since demand for airline services may well be an endogenous variable -
and thus a biased control variable in our equations caused by a correlation between the error
term and the PAS variable - we instrument out this effect by including instruments expected to
be highly correlated with demand for airline services for each route and not correlated with
capacity. The included instruments are tax income to the region corresponding to each route,
population in the region, and the expenditures of the municipalities in the regions (see the
Appendix for details on the construction of these variables). Furthermore, we will expect that
heteroscedasticity might be a problem here since increased size of the routes may lead to
                                                                                                                                                                           
15On average there are 23.75 flights per day on a large route, a small route have an average of 6.13 flights per
13
higher variance. Heteroscedasticity is first tested for and then corrected for by using a robust
estimator with route size as the grouping variable. For all the models we estimate and report
results for the OLS, the Instrument and Instrument/robust estimators.
4.  Empirical results
Test of hypothesis 1: Collusion vs. Competition/Semicollusion
In Table 1 the results from estimating Model 1 with the four estimators are presented.
Table 1 here
The model explains well the variation in total capacity. The explanatory power is convincing,
and the control variables PAS and REG94 have the expected signs and have significant impact.
When exploiting the panel structure of the data and estimating with the within estimator, we
notice from column 2 that the results from the OLS estimator carrries over. Further, since the
variance may increase as a function of route size, we used a Cook-Weisberg test for
heteroscedasticity. The H0 of constant variance is rejected for the OLS specification and a
robust estimator utilized to estimate the variance-covariance matrix. Further, since PAS is
expected to be an endogenous variable, the 2SLS instrument estimator was used. All three
estimators, i.e., OLS, 2SLS and 2SLS/robust, show very similar results supporting our general
specification.
                                                                                                                                                                           
day (see Table A1 in the Appendix).
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The most important result from Table 1 is that the interaction term REG94*MON is
negative and has a significant impact.   This shows that deregulation led to increased capacity
for the routes shifting from monopoly to duopoly routes in excess of the increased demand for
airline services (the reference groups). Hence, deregulation led to more intense rivalry.
However, we cannot use these results to conclude whether the post-regulation regime is a
competitive or semicollusive regime. Hence, now we turn to our second model to test
hypothesis 2.
Test of hypothesis 2: Competition  vs. Semicollusion
Table 2 presents results from estimating Model (II) for all 11 routes where the aim now is to
distinguish between semicollusion and competition.
Table 2 here
The within estimator provides support for the OLS results also for this model. The same test
for heteroscedasticity was undertaken and a constant variance rejected. Hence, a robust
estimator was used. Further, the 2SLS estimator was used since PAS is expected to be
endogenous. The four specifications show a very a similar and stable pattern in explaining the
variation in total capacity. The control variables have the expected signs and are significantly
different from zero.
The interaction term between the variable for deregulation, REG94, and the size of the
market, LARGE, is positive and has a significant impact.  It shows that market size matters for
the Norwegian airlines’ investment in total capacity following a deregulation: Capacity is more
15
sensitive to changes in demand in a large than in a small market. Hence, we are able to
distinguish between a semicollusive and competitive regime. Since investment in total capacity
following deregulation is predicted from theory to be dependent on market size only when
semicollusion characterises the relationship among firms, our results reject a competitive
regime.
The four largest routes are all duopoly routes. In order to ensure that the positive
relationship between market size and investment in capacity found in model (II) is not driven
by routes going from monopoly to duopoly (a deregulation effect), but rather is a “pure” size
effect, we now estimate model (II) only for the duopoly routes. These results are presented in
Table 3.
Table 3 here
The results of Model (II) only for the duopoly routes are parallel to what we found when
estimating Model (II) for all routes. Even though the size effect is less significant now – with
the exception of the fixed effect estimator where it is not significant at conventional levels -we
still find size to have a positive effect on capacity; the interaction term REG94*LARGE is
positive in all three models in Table 3.16 The effect is significant at all conventional levels for
the IV-specification. Moreover, the significance level is within 90 percent in both remaining
cases (90 percent for the OLS and 93 percent for the IV/robust regressions, respectively).17
                                                       
16For the fixed effect estimator the sign of the parameters points in the right direction, but since we are limiting
the variation in the data dramatically using the within estimator for only the duopoly routes it is probably to
ask too much of the data to expect it to be significant.
17An additional explanation for the lower significance in these models, might be that we have considerable
fewer observations and thereby less variance.
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Hence, even when we only include the duopoly routes we can reject the competitive regime.
We found that our results are consistent with a semicollusion regime.18
5.  Some concluding remarks
The purpose of this paper has been to test the effect of the deregulation in the Norwegian
airline industry in 1994.  Did the two established firms, SAS and Braathens, compete after
deregulation?  If yes, did they compete on capacity, on price, or both?  First, we find that it
was a significant increase in capacity on the duopoly routes following deregulation.  Hence,
we reject our hypothesis that deregulation resulted in collusion on both prices and capacity.
Second, we find that a marginal change in demand had a larger effect on large than on small
duopoly routes in the period after deregulation.  This is consistent with a semicollusive regime,
where the firms collude on prices and compete on capacities, and not consistent with a
competitive regime where they compete along both dimensions.
Casual observation lends support to what we here have found.  Lian (1996) suggests
that there is no fierce price competition in the business segment. A representative for
Braathens, the public relation manager Audun Tjomsland, explained the lack of fierce price
competition in the following way:
‘The two Norwegian firms on Norwegian routes, Braathens and SAS, are of equal size
and can follow each other during a price war.  A firm starting a price-war will quickly
be followed by the rival firm, so the firm that starts a war will have an advantage only
a day or two.  Accordingly, the firms are reluctant to trigger a price war’ (our
translation) [Bergens Tidende, 31/7/95]
                                                       
18As noted in footnote 14, the possible bias due to low-price sale of idle seats in the leisure segment actually
enforce our results. When our models suggest an increase in capacity even when we control for all passengers,
this  implies that our results are even more robust.
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Moreover, other statements suggest that the two firms did compete intensely along other
dimesions, among others capacity.  For example, Braathens explained its poor result in the
first quarter of 1996 in the following way:
‘Braathens explains this [poor result] with an increased competition.  The firm has
increased its capacity, but it has not helped much.  The growth results in an increase
in employment and other costs of production (our translation) [Dagens Næringsliv,
10/5/96]
A few months earlier, SAS had announced several new initiatives:
‘Among the initiatives are recruitment on the ground and in the cabin, adjustment of
time-scheduling of flights, an increase in capacity amounting to 400.000 seats
annually, better food on business class between Norway and other countries, .. (our
translation) [Bergens Tidende, 9/3/96].
It is of interest to note that none of them mention price cuts.  Hence, these statements are
consistent with what we have found: Collusion on prices and competition on capacities.
Although the phrase semicollusion is seldom used, we find numerous examples of this
phenomenon in real life.19  So we find indications that this is just another example of such a
phenomenon, which illustrates that such a nature of competition should be taken into
consideration as one possible scenario when discussing the possible effects of deregulating a
particular industry.
                                                       
19Price collusion led to intense rivalry on advertising in the American cigarette industry [see Scherer (1980), p.
388-389], the installing of excess capacity in the German [see Scherer (1980), p. 370] as well as the US cement
industry [see Scherer and Ross (1990), p. 674], and to excess capacity in ocean shipping [see Scherer and Ross
(1990), p. 674].  The existence of cartels in the domestic Japanese market, where quotas were allocated
according to relative capacity, led to excess capacity in many Japanese industries during the 50s and 60s [see
Matsui (1989)].  The price cartel in the Norwegian cement market led to the installment of excess capacity in
the Norwegian cement industry in the 50s and 60s, which showed up as a large increase in exports [see Steen
and Sørgard (1998)].
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Appendix - Data definitions and data sources
Capacity and passenger figures
The calculation of capacity on each route is based on departures, flight schedules and
information on air carriers in the “Books of Norwegian flight schedules” from 1985 to 1995.
Passenger figures on route-level are provided by the Norwegian Civil Aviation Authority.
In order to calculate the capacity on each route, the number of weekly departures are
counted for the two air carriers BU and SAS. The capacity for each air carrier is then
calculated by multiplying the number of departures by the capacity of the particular plane used.
The sum of the capacity for each air carrier is the total capacity for the route. For the
calculation of monthly capacity, the weekly capacity is multiplied by a factor 26/6 to reflect the
fact that there are more than 4 weeks in a month. The annual capacity is then aggregated using
the monthly figures. All non-stop departures are included. The analysed routes are shown in
Table A1:
Table A1 The analysed routes, number of departures and competition status
City-pair
Number
City-pair
Codes
City-pair
Names
Non-stop
Departures 1995
Competition
status*
Definition
LARGEit
1 FBU-TRD Oslo - Trondheim 27 D 1
2 FBU-BOO Oslo - Bodø 7 D 0
3 FBU-TOS Oslo - Tromsø 9 D 0
4 FBU-BGO Oslo - Bergen 24 D 1
5 FBU-STV Oslo - Stavanger 24 D 1
6 BGO-STV Bergen - Stavanger 20 D 1
7 TRD-AES Trondheim - Å lesund 4 M 0
8 FBU-KRS Oslo - Kristiansand 7 M 0
9 FBU-AES Oslo -Å lesund 6 M 0
10 FBU-HAU Oslo - Haugesund 8 M 0
11** FBU-MOL Oslo - Molde 5 M 0
12** FBU-KSU Oslo - Kristiansund 3 M 0
*/ D  = Duopoly, M = Monopoly
**/ Routes 11 and 12
On the routes from Oslo to Molde and from Oslo to Kristiansund, Braathens SAFE has monopoly. From 1985
to 1991 these two routes were basically one route; first the air carriers flew to Molde and then to Kristiansund.
From 1991, Braathens SAFE has increased the number of non-stop flights to Kristiansund considerably. Since
only non-stop flights are included in the analysis, and the fact that the figures we use to represent the
passenger variable includes all passengers, the capacity and passenger figures are not comparable over time
when looking at the individual routes (11 and 12). To adjust for this effect, the following are done:
· the numbers of passengers are summarised for fbu-mol and fbu-ksu for each year
· from 1985 to 1991 only the capacity numbers for fbu-mol are used. From 1991, the capacity also
for the route fbu-ksu are included.
 
 Hence, route 11 and 12 are aggregated, leaving us with 11 city-pair routes to be analysed.
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 Demand Instruments
 
 The demand instruments used in this study are collected from “The Norwegian Social Science
Data Service, “The Municipal Database” and are as follows:
 
· Population in total, collected from the “census of population”.
· Gross Expenditures in total, collected from municipal accounts at the municipal
level. Chapter 1, item 000-599 until 1991, and chapter 1 item 01-59 from 1991.
· Taxes, collected from the municipal accounts; chapter 1.900 until 1991, and chapter
1.800, from 1991.
In order to be able to use the figures in the analysis, the numbers are aggregated to regions
corresponding to the city-pairs. The basis for the aggregation is the classification of municipals
explained below, where closeness in terms of commuting area around each airport are used as
the aggregation criterion. The figures from each municipal that is located in the airport region
are aggregated. Using these airport region figures we then aggregate into 11 city-pair regions.
Classification of Municipals
The classification of municipals is based on “The Norwegian Official Statistics, Standard for
Municipal Classification - 1994”,  and “Regional classification in the general equilibrium
model,  MISMOD”, WP 63/1990, Centre for Applied Research, by Frode Steen. Municipals
are categorised and given a centrality code which indicates the commuting possibilities
(closeness) between the airport area and the municipal. Dependent on the size of the nearby
cities, the municipals are given centrality codes. For the largest cities; Oslo, Bergen,
Trondheim, Stavanger and Kristiansand, centrality code “3” indicates good commuting
possibilities and short distance in time to the airport (which always are located within, or very
close to its city municipal). For the airports located in the smaller cities; Haugesund, Å lesund,
Molde, Kristiansund, Bodø and Tromsø, the centrality code “2” indicates good commuting
possibilities. Hence, the classification used here is based on these codes, where all relevant
(close) municipals are attributed to one of the 11 airports included in our 11 city-pairs. Then
these 11 regions are aggregated into city-pair variables. Table A2 summarises the municipals,
and their airport region codes.
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Table A2 The municipals’ airport  region codes
Air-
port
Code*
Mun-
icipal
No
Municipal
Name
Air-
port
Code*
Mun-
icipal
No
Municipal
Name
Air-
port
Code*
Mun-
icipal
No
Municipal
Name
Air-
port
Code*
Mun-
icipal
No
Municipal
Name
1 104 Moss 1 533 Lunner 3 1120 Klepp 6 1532 Giske
1 123 Spydeberg 1 534 Gran 3 1121 Time 6 1534 Haram
1 124 Askim 1 602 Drammen 3 1122 Gjesdal 7 1502 Molde
1 135 Råde 1 604 Kongsberg 3 1124 Sola 7 1535 Vestnes
1 136 Rygge 1 605 Ringerike 3 1127 Randaberg 7 1543 Nesset
1 137 Våler 1 612 Hole 3 1129 Forsand 7 1547 Aukra
1 138 Hobøl 1 623 Modum 3 1130 Strand 7 1548 Fræna
1 211 Vestby 1 624 Ø vre Eiker 3 1141 Finnøy 7 1551 Eide
1 213 Ski 1 625 Nedre Eiker 3 1142 Rennesøy 8 1503 Kristiansund
1 214 Å s 1 626 Lier 3 1145 Bokn 8 1554 Averøy
1 215 Frogn 1 627 Røyken 4 1106 Haugesund 8 1556 Frei
1 216 Nesodden 1 628 Hurum 4 1146 Tysvær 8 1557 Gjemnes
1 217 Oppegård 1 702 Holmestrand 4 1149 Karmøy 8 1572 Tustna
1 219 Bærum 1 711 Svelvik 5 1201 Bergen 9 1601 Trondheim
1 220 Asker 1 713 Sande 5 1241 Fusa 9 1624 Rissa
1 221 Aurskog-
Høland
1 714 Hof 5 1242 Samnan-
ger
9 1638 Orkdal
1 226 Sørum 2 904 Grimstad 5 1243 Os 9 1648 Midtre
Gauldal
1 227 Fet 2 926 Lillesand 5 1245 Sund 9 1653 Melhus
1 228 Rælingen 2 935 Iveland 5 1246 Fjell 9 1657 Skaun
1 229 Enebakk 2 937 Evje og
Hornnes
5 1247 Askøy 9 1662 Klæbu
1 230 Lørenskog 2 1001 Kristiansand 5 1251 Vaksdal 9 1663 Malvik
1 231 Skedsmo 2 1002 Mandal 5 1253 Osterøy 9 1664 Selbu
1 233 Nittedal 2 1014 Vennesla 5 1256 Meland 9 1714 Stjørdal
1 234 Gjerdrum 2 1017 Songdalen 5 1259 Ø ygarden 9 1719 Levanger
1 235 Ullensaker 2 1018 Søgne 5 1260 Radøy 10 1804 Bodø
1 236 Nes 2 1021 Marnardal 5 1263 Lindås 10 1840 Saltdal
1 237 Eidsvoll 2 1027 Audnedal 6 1504 Å lesund 10 1841 Fauske
1 238 Nannestad 2 1029 Lindesnes 6 1517 Hareid 11 1902 Tromsø
1 239 Hurdal 3 1102 Sandnes 6 1523 Ø rskog 11 1933 Balsfjord
1 301 Oslo 3 1103 Stavanger 6 1528 Sykkylven 11 1936 Karlsøy
1 419 Sør-Odal 3 1114 Bjerkreim 6 1529 Skodje
1 532 Jevnaker 3 1119 Hå 6 1531 Sula
*/ Airport region codes used in the table translate to airports as follows:
1 - Oslo 5 - Bergen 9 - Trondheim
2 - Kristiansand 6 - Å lesund 10 - Bodø
3 - Stavanger 7 - Molde 11 - Tromsø
4 - Haugesund 8 - Kristiansund
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Table 1: Results for Model (I).
Variable Model (I),
OLS
Fixed Effects (I) Model (I),
Instrument
Model (I),
Instrument/robust
Param. St.error Param. St.error Param. St.error Param. St.error
PAS 1.828* 0.056 2.12* 0.167 1.55* 0.083 1.54* 0.165
REG94 89051* 24727 65308* 24291 136299* 28738 137730* 52326
REG94*MON -82560* 34373 -76035* 28753 -145487* 39772 -147393* 55618
Constant 10.57* 12322 -52988* 29489 47570* 16588 49011* 28412
Cook-Weisb. Chi2(1)=14.84
R 2 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.82
# OBS 121 121 121 121
Root MSE 74351 74351 81600 81913
*/ Significance level 95 percent.
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Table 2: Results for Model (II), using all routes.
Variable Model (II),
OLS
Fixed Effects (II) Model (II),
Instrument
Model (II),
Instrument/robust
Param. St.error Param. St.error Param. St.error Param. St.error
PAS 1.77* 0.057 2.15* 0.177 1.56* 0.078 1.56* 0.143
REG94 6941* 20747 8652* 17989 -1720 22073 -1720 21526
REG94*LARGE 131361* 36260 56471* 31688 196048* 41094 196048* 74867
Constant 8134* 12322 -56968* 31348 46042* 15619 46042* 26188
Cook-Weisb. Chi(1)=18.77
R 2 0.93 0.95 0.92 0.92
# OBS 56712 56712 121 121
Root MSE 72219 56712 76635 76535
*/ Significance level 95 percent.
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Table 3: Results for Model (II), using only the duopoly routes.
Variable Model (II),
OLS
Fixed Effects (II) Model (II),
Instrument
Model (II),
Instrument/robust
Param. St.error Param. St.error Param. St.error Param. St.error
PAS 1.85* 0.1001 2.11* 0.25 1.3222* 0.188 0.3478* 1.282
REG94 23114 48653 43106 43106 -13372 59216 60680 1843427
REG94*LARGE 104340** 62370 8945 53295 237651* 83242 102885** 5.615
Constant -13754* 28013 -78155 61576 116695 490223 94268 330302
Cook-Weisb. Chi(1)=15.21
R 2 0.89 0.93 0.84 0.85
# OBS 66 66 66 66
Root MSE 92916 74443 110000 110000
*/ Significance level 95 percent, **/ Significance level 90 percent.
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Figure 3.  Market structure in 1995 on the 12 domestic routes
Available on request to the authors
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Figure 4.  Capacity and number of passengers 1985-96 on four routes
Available on request to the authors
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